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BRICS finance ministers and central bank governors have stepped up efforts to reduce the vulnerability of emerging economies to trade protectionism and dollar-centered financial systems, backing measures to expand local-currency trade, link payment networks and increase development financing as global economic fragmentation accelerates.
The agenda, finalized at meetings in Mumbai on September 10 following discussions in Jaipur in August, stops short of proposing a common BRICS currency but seeks to build the financial plumbing needed for members to conduct more trade outside traditional dollar-based channels.
That makes the initiative potentially more consequential than the group’s repeated calls for de-dollarization, although its success will depend on whether banks and companies find the new arrangements cheaper, more liquid and more reliable than existing systems.
Under India’s 2026 BRICS chairship, financial leaders also challenged unilateral tariffs and non-tariff barriers, calling for a rules-based, non-discriminatory trading system with the World Trade Organization at its core.
The message comes as tariffs, export controls, industrial subsidies and supply-chain restrictions increasingly shape international commerce, raising concerns among developing economies about higher trade costs and reduced access to major markets.
BRICS, which has expanded beyond its original membership, is seeking to turn its growing share of global economic output and trade into greater influence over the institutions that govern international finance.
Local currencies at center of payments push
The most immediate test will be cross-border payments.
The BRICS Payment Task Force has advanced work on interoperability between payment and financial messaging systems and on mechanisms to facilitate greater use of members’ national currencies in trade.
The approach is significant because it does not require the creation of a single BRICS currency or a unified monetary system.
Instead, members are looking to connect existing domestic payment infrastructures and establish bilateral or multilateral settlement corridors that allow trade to be conducted in local currencies.
Greater use of local currencies could reduce conversion costs and lessen exposure to swings in major reserve currencies. It could also reduce the need for some transactions to pass through the dollar, potentially lowering dependence on financial infrastructure dominated by the United States.
But de-dollarization faces a basic market constraint: currencies become international payment instruments when businesses and financial institutions want to hold, trade and invest in them.
Liquidity, convertibility, exchange-rate stability, settlement arrangements and the depth of domestic capital markets will therefore be more important than political declarations.
For BRICS, the objective may ultimately be less about displacing the dollar than creating enough alternatives to reduce the economic and geopolitical risks associated with excessive dependence on it.
Trade protectionism raises stakes
The financial initiatives are unfolding against a broader deterioration in the predictability of global trade.
BRICS finance leaders criticized unilateral trade and financial measures, including higher tariffs and non-tariff barriers, saying they distort trade and undermine multilateral rules.
The grouping reaffirmed the WTO’s central role and called for a more representative global trading system.
For emerging economies, the concern is not simply the level of tariffs but the cumulative effect of fragmented rules, shifting supply chains, export restrictions and rising compliance costs.
The response from BRICS is increasingly two-track: defend multilateral institutions while simultaneously developing alternative channels for trade and finance.
That strategy could give members greater resilience, but it also risks deepening the fragmentation it seeks to mitigate if parallel systems evolve without interoperability with existing global networks.
IMF and World Bank reform remains unresolved
BRICS also renewed pressure for changes at the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, arguing that governance structures have failed to keep pace with the changing distribution of global economic power.
Finance leaders called for implementation of the IMF’s 16th General Review of Quotas and early quota realignment under the 17th review, while stressing that greater representation for emerging economies should not come at the expense of poorer countries.
They also backed reforms to World Bank shareholding and called for transparent, merit-based selection of senior leadership with greater regional diversity.
The demands reflect a long-running frustration among emerging economies that institutions created after World War Two continue to give disproportionate influence to advanced economies.
Yet institutional reform remains harder to achieve than creating new BRICS mechanisms, making the group’s parallel financial initiatives increasingly important.
NDB seeks bigger role in development finance
The New Development Bank is expected to be the principal vehicle for turning that ambition into actual lending.
BRICS finance leaders backed the bank’s expansion of membership, greater use of local-currency financing and stronger project-preparation capabilities as it enters what they called its “second golden decade”.
The bank is also piloting a BRICS Multilateral Guarantees initiative aimed at reducing risks associated with sustainable infrastructure and attracting private capital.
For developing countries, guarantees could have a larger practical impact than new declarations if they lower risk premiums and make infrastructure projects easier to finance.
BRICS has separately agreed to establish a Study Group for a proposed New Investment Platform, building on work begun under Brazil’s chairship.
The challenge will be to ensure such mechanisms mobilize capital rather than create another layer of institutions with limited private-sector participation.
Financial safety nets and risk-sharing
BRICS has also advanced amendments to its Contingent Reserve Arrangement, seeking to make the emergency financial safety net more flexible during periods of external stress.
The grouping is considering further testing of the mechanism and possible participation by new members.
India is meanwhile promoting a proposed BRICS Risk Lab at GIFT City International Financial Services Centre, aimed at strengthening cooperation in insurance and reinsurance.
That initiative reflects a broader effort to address the risk constraints facing infrastructure investment, particularly in economies vulnerable to climate disasters, supply-chain disruptions and geopolitical shocks.
Tax, customs and cyber cooperation expand
The financial agenda is also moving into customs and taxation, areas with direct consequences for multinational businesses.
After its first joint customs enforcement operation, BRICS members gave in-principle approval to a Customs Mutual Administrative Assistance Agreement and called for implementation of the BRICS Authorized Economic Operator Action Plan 2026.
Tax working groups are focusing on international taxation, transfer pricing and revenue statistics, while BRICS initiatives seek to increase cooperation between tax administrations.
The objective is to make legitimate trade easier while improving the ability of governments to tackle illicit financial flows, profit shifting and revenue leakage.
Financial cybersecurity is another emerging priority.
Central banks agreed to conduct annual cyber exercises through the BRICS Rapid Information Security Channel, while the grouping is examining the impact of artificial intelligence and quantum computing on financial systems.
China inherits the implementation challenge
China is due to take over the BRICS chair in 2027 with an agenda that is already extensive: making payment systems interoperable, expanding local-currency settlements, operationalizing investment and guarantee mechanisms, strengthening the Contingent Reserve Arrangement and expanding NDB financing.
The harder task will be translating political consensus among economies with very different monetary regimes, capital markets and regulatory systems into infrastructure that businesses actually use.
That is particularly true for de-dollarization.
BRICS can encourage local-currency settlement, but it cannot simply legislate international demand for its members’ currencies. The dollar’s role is supported by deep capital markets, extensive trade invoicing, liquidity and a large global financial ecosystem.
Any credible BRICS alternative will therefore have to compete on cost, speed, liquidity and reliability.
The 2026 agenda nevertheless mark a shift from rhetoric towards infrastructure.
If BRICS succeeds in connecting payment systems, expanding local-currency financing, reducing investment risk and strengthening development finance, it could gradually give emerging economies more options in a global financial system increasingly shaped by geopolitical competition.
The immediate goal is unlikely to be the end of dollar dominance.
It is the creation of alternatives that make dollar dependence less unavoidable.
That distinction could prove critical as trade protectionism and financial fragmentation reshape the global economy.
