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India’s deepening defense trade with major European Union member states such as France, Germany, Spain, and Italy has become one of the defining strategic trends in South Asia over the past decade. From Rafale fighter jets and submarines to artillery, helicopters, and naval platforms, India’s defense engagement with Europe reflects its ambition to diversify suppliers, reduce dependence on Russia, and position itself as a credible military counterweight to China.
Against this backdrop, the question of where Bangladesh stands is not merely about arms procurement. It is about how a smaller South Asian state navigates intensifying great-power competition, especially as China’s strategic footprint expands across the region and the Indo-Pacific becomes increasingly militarized.
From a Chinese perspective, India’s defense partnerships with EU states are closely watched because they reinforce New Delhi’s role in the emerging balance-of-power architecture that seeks to constrain China. Although European countries do not frame their defense exports to India as part of a containment strategy, Beijing understands that advanced European technology enhances India’s military capabilities along disputed borders and in the Indian Ocean. This dynamic matters for Bangladesh because it sits at the geographical and strategic intersection of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Bay of Bengal, a space where Chinese and Indian interests increasingly overlap.
Bangladesh’s defense posture differs fundamentally from India’s. While India seeks power projection and regional dominance, Bangladesh prioritizes regime security, territorial integrity, disaster response, and participation in UN peacekeeping. Its defense modernization is real but modest in scale, driven by the need to upgrade aging platforms rather than to challenge regional powers. For China, Bangladesh represents a different kind of partner than India: not a rival to be balanced, but a strategically located state whose political goodwill, market potential, and access to maritime routes are valuable.
China has emerged as Bangladesh’s largest defense supplier over the last two decades, providing submarines, frigates, tanks, artillery, and fighter aircraft. These ties are rooted in affordability, flexible financing, and political non-interference. Unlike India’s defense deals with Europe, which are often embedded in strategic narratives about shared values and regional leadership, Bangladesh’s engagement with China has been transactional and pragmatic. From Beijing’s viewpoint, this is a success story. Chinese defense exports to Bangladesh reinforce long-term military-to-military ties, create dependency on Chinese maintenance and training ecosystems, and quietly anchor China’s presence in the Bay of Bengal.
However, Bangladesh does not operate in a strategic vacuum. India’s expanding defense cooperation with Europe indirectly affects Dhaka by shifting the regional military balance. As India acquires more advanced platforms, its ability to project power into the Bay of Bengal increases. For Bangladesh, this raises uncomfortable questions about strategic autonomy. While Dhaka and New Delhi officially enjoy cordial relations, historical mistrust, unresolved water disputes, and domestic political sensitivities ensure that Bangladesh remains cautious about excessive Indian influence. China’s role, therefore, becomes that of a balancing partner rather than an overt security guarantor.
From the standpoint of South Asia’s security architecture, Bangladesh’s position is emblematic of a broader regional pattern. Smaller states such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal seek to hedge between competing powers rather than align firmly with one camp. China understands this instinct and tailors its approach accordingly. Unlike in India’s case, Beijing does not perceive Bangladesh as an adversary. Instead, it sees Dhaka as a country whose strategic choices can either stabilize or complicate China’s southern periphery.
Bangladesh’s limited engagement with European defense suppliers further distinguishes it from India. While Dhaka has procured some systems from European sources in the past, cost constraints, bureaucratic complexity, and political considerations have kept these ties shallow.Â
From a Chinese perspective, this is advantageous. European defense exports often come with regulatory restrictions, transparency requirements, and political conditions that Bangladesh’s military establishment may find cumbersome. China’s ability to deliver quickly and without overt political strings gives it a competitive edge, especially when Bangladesh’s defense priorities are defensive rather than strategic.
Yet China also recognizes the risks of overdependence. A Bangladesh armed forces almost entirely equipped with Chinese hardware could provoke strategic anxiety in India and invite external pressure on Dhaka. Beijing has therefore been careful not to push Bangladesh into an overtly pro-China security posture. Instead, it supports Dhaka’s narrative of strategic neutrality. This restraint reflects a broader Chinese understanding of South Asian sensitivities, where aggressive posturing often backfires and strengthens India’s regional leverage.
India’s defense ties with Europe also highlight a contrast in political capacity. India can leverage its large market, diplomatic clout, and shared interests with Western powers to negotiate technology transfers and joint production. Bangladesh lacks this bargaining power. From a Chinese viewpoint, this asymmetry reinforces the notion that South Asia will remain hierarchically structured, with India at the top and smaller states operating within constrained strategic space. China’s engagement with Bangladesh, therefore, is less about transforming the regional order and more about ensuring that India’s dominance is not absolute.
The Bay of Bengal is central to this calculation. As India enhances its naval capabilities with European support, the bay becomes an increasingly contested maritime domain. For China, access to ports, logistics, and friendly governments around the bay is crucial for securing sea lanes and supporting its broader Indo-Pacific interests. Bangladesh’s ports and coastal infrastructure, even when civilian in nature, acquire strategic significance in this context. Beijing’s defense relationship with Dhaka complements its economic and infrastructure investments, creating a layered presence that stops short of militarization but still serves strategic ends.
At the same time, Bangladesh’s leadership remains acutely aware of the dangers of being perceived as a Chinese outpost. Dhaka consistently emphasizes that its ties with China are not directed against any third party. This messaging aligns with China’s preference for ambiguity in South Asia, where subtle influence often yields better outcomes than overt alliances. In contrast, India’s defense engagement with Europe is increasingly explicit and strategic, which Beijing interprets as a sign of New Delhi’s growing confidence and ambition.
Ultimately, where Bangladesh stands is not at one pole or another, but in the middle of an intensifying strategic contest. From China’s perspective, this middle ground is both an opportunity and a constraint. It limits India’s ability to dominate the eastern subcontinent unchallenged, but it also prevents China from translating its influence into formal security arrangements. In a region where perceptions matter as much as capabilities, Bangladesh’s careful balancing act helps prevent South Asia from becoming a rigidly polarized theater.
In conclusion, India’s substantial defense trade with EU member states underscores its emergence as a major security actor in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific, a development that China views with growing concern. Against this backdrop, Bangladesh occupies a quieter but no less important position. It is neither an aspiring regional hegemon nor a passive bystander. Instead, it is a pragmatic state navigating structural constraints and strategic opportunities.
From China’s standpoint, Bangladesh’s value lies in its stability, its openness to diversified partnerships, and its resistance to binary choices. As South Asia’s security environment becomes more contested, Bangladesh’s stance may not dominate headlines, but it will continue to shape the region’s strategic equilibrium in subtle and significant ways.
Disclaimer: The opinions and views expressed in this article/column are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of South Asian Herald.
